From Captivity to Home: The Untold Story Behind Abhinandan’s Release
Behind the Scenes of Abhinandan’s Release: How India’s Aggressive Diplomacy and Tactical Moves Forced Pakistan to Back Down and Secured the Safe Return of Wing Commander Abhinandan
On October 28, 2020, Ayaz Sadiq, a Member of Pakistan’s National Assembly, made a statement recalling the tense period following the Pulwama terrorist attack on a convoy of Indian Paramilitary Forces “CRPF” in Jammu and Kashmir. He mentioned that, during a crucial meeting, then Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi had stressed that if Pakistan did not release Indian Air Force’s Pilot Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman, India would attack Pakistan “that night by 9 pm.” Abhinandan had been captured by the Pakistan Army after his aircraft crashed in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, following his successful engagement with a Pakistani F-16.
But was the Pakistani Parliamentarian telling the truth? Was the Indian government, led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, genuinely prepared to launch an attack on Pakistan if the pilot was not released? Let us delve into the situation unfolding on both sides during that time, as narrated in the book “Anger Management: The Troubled Diplomatic Relationship Between India and Pakistan” by Ajay Bisaria, who served as the Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan then.
Ajay Bisaria Sir’s book provides an in-depth examination of the diplomatic ties between the two nations since their independence in 1947. The final section of the book focuses on the state of India-Pakistan relations from 2017 to 2023. The second-to-last chapter delves into the Pulwama attack carried out by a Pakistan-supported terrorist group and elaborates on the robust diplomatic approach taken by India in response to the incident.
Ajay Bisaria, who served as the Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan from 2017 to 2020, was directly involved in the diplomatic actions that took place following the Pulwama attack. His insights provide a detailed understanding of the story behind the release of IAF Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman. We need to discuss that story because when then Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan announced Abhinandan’s release, several anti-government activists and members of the Indian civil society praised Imran Khan’s decision, even describing it as a “masterstroke” of “Naya” Pakistan. However, these voices largely overlooked or deliberately ignored the aggressive diplomatic stance India had adopted at the time, which was instrumental in ensuring the pilot’s safe return. Bisaria’s experience reveals how Indian diplomacy played a decisive role, pressuring Pakistan into releasing Abhinandan promptly, contrary to the popular narrative that credited Pakistan’s goodwill.
The Innitial Hours
On February 14, 2019, at approximately 3:15 p.m., a tragic incident unfolded in Lethpora, a village in Pulwama, located along the Srinagar-Jammu National Highway. A convoy of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) was targeted by a suicide bomber, Adil Ahmed Dar, who rammed his explosive-laden vehicle into one of the buses in the convoy. The devastating attack resulted in the martyrdom of 40 CRPF soldiers.
The Pulwama attack on February 14, 2019, was one of the most significant terrorist attack against Indian security forces in J&K and highlighted a major intelligence lapse within the Indian government’s security apparatus.
Ajay Bisaria wrote that Indian intelligence agencies and diplomats posted in Pakistan had gathered information indicating that the attack was orchestrated by the ISI of Pakistan and carried out by Jaish-e-Mohammed. However, they underestimated the scale of the attack, believing it would target a smaller convoy with approximately 12-15 soldiers. The actual outcome was far more devastating.
At the time of the attack, Ajay Bisaria was the Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan. He immediately traveled to New Delhi from Islamabad, and from February 15, 2019, a series of high-level meetings began at the South Block. The first meeting was held with Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Bisaria arrived 30 minutes late to the meeting, as he had forgotten to adjust his watch from Pakistan Standard Time, which is 30 minutes behind Indian Standard Time, amidst the chaos following the attack.
During this meeting, the Union Cabinet made several decisions in response to the Pulwama attack. One of the first actions was to revoke Pakistan’s Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status. Additionally, a 200% customs duty was imposed on all imports from Pakistan, effectively halting Pakistan’s exports to India. Several other measures were considered, including a review of the Indus Water Treaty. It was decided that India would limit the sharing of hydrological data with Pakistan, which until then had exceeded the requirements of the treaty.
Following the meeting with Prime Minister Modi, Indian Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale held discussions with officials from the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). He also met with foreign representatives from Germany, South Korea, Japan, and Australia.
Ajay Bisaria noted that this level of urgent and aggressive diplomacy was unprecedented in Indian history since 1947.
The Aggressive Indian Diplomacy
On February 19, 2019, Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan addressed the nation via television, asserting that Pakistan was not involved in the Pulwama terror attack. He urged Indian authorities to share any information or intelligence they had regarding the attack, promising that Pakistan would conduct an investigation. Khan’s response echoed a long-standing pattern that Pakistan had followed since the 1980s, where similar claims were made after each terrorist attack on Indian civilians and security forces.
Amidst all these developments, an official state visit by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman was scheduled for February 19-20, 2019, to India. Prime Minister Narendra Modi personally welcomed Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman at the airport, breaking established protocol to emphasize the importance of the visit. During their discussions, Prime Minister Modi personally lodged a strong objection regarding the Pulwama terrorist attack with the MBS. As a result, in the joint statement issued after their meeting, Saudi Arabia condemned the attack on Indian security forces in Jammu and Kashmir.
India approached the European Union and the UNSC, submitting a dossier detailing Pakistan’s support for Masood Azhar, the Jaish-e-Mohammed chief, and the operation of JeM bases under the supervision of Pakistan’s military and intelligence circle.
A week after the Pulwama attack, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi was scheduled to visit Japan. However, the Indian government, through back channels, made it clear to the Japanese authorities that they should either cancel the visit or openly condemn Pakistan for sponsoring terrorism and denounce the Pulwama attack. Consequently, Japan decided to cancel the visit. Despite this, the Pakistan’s media and government portrayed it as though the Foreign Minister himself had cancelled the trip, while in reality, it was due to pressure from the Indian government.
On February 21st, Ajay Bisaria met with then Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj, informing her that diplomatic efforts had succeeded, and the world now believed that Pakistan was behind the Pulwama attack. He suggested that he should return to Islamabad, but Minister Swaraj responded that she would decide about his return.
On February 25th, India shared a dossier with the French Ambassador, detailing the involvement of the Pakistani government and Masood Azhar’s presence in Pakistan, and requested that it be presented to the UNSC. India also informed all the other P5 members of the UNSC, except China. NSA Ajit Doval discussed the matter with his French counterpart, and the EU envoy to India was called to the South Block for discussions. Additionally, diplomatic channels were opened with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to further address the issue.
The Balakot Air Strike and Pak’s Retaliation
On February 26th, 2019, it was a severely cold morning in Delhi. Ajay Bisaria had only managed to sleep for 2-3 hours due to hectic meetings. At 5:30 a.m., his phone rang—it was his junior from the Indian High Commission in Pakistan, informing him that the Director General of Inter-Services Public Relations (DG ISPR) of Pakistan had tweeted that an Indian Air Force fighter jet had entered Pakistan and dropped a single bomb.
Bisaria was called for a Cabinet meeting scheduled before 9 a.m. that day, which concluded at 11:30 a.m. During the meeting, it was decided that Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale would brief the media about the Indian airstrikes on terrorist launch pads in the Balakot area of Pakistan.
Secretary Gokhale held a press conference, informing the media that Indian fighter jets had dropped five bombs around 50 kilometers inside Pakistan at 3:00 a.m. on February 26th. He stated that all Indian jets returned safely after successfully hitting their targets with precision. However, Pakistan denied these claims, despite initially admitting that an Indian plane had dropped a single bomb.
Later the same day, External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj called Bisaria, asking, “How’s the Josh?” to which Bisaria replied, “High, ma’am.” Minister Swaraj also inquired about the morale of his team in Pakistan and whether they were facing any harassment from Pakistani authorities, to which Bisaria assured her that everything is fine.
The DG ISPR also held a press conference, stating, “We will retaliate and surprise India.” The irony was that, just a few hours earlier, Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry had been denying that any Indian airstrikes had occurred.
On the second day of the airstrikes, February 27th, Pakistan initiated heavy firing along the Line of Control (LoC) even before sunrise. The firing began near the Pir Panjal Range, and by 5 a.m., artillery shelling from the Pakistani side had also commenced
February 27th, Pakistan began heavy firing along the Line of Control (LoC) even before sunrise, starting near the Pir Panjal Range. By 5 a.m., artillery shelling had also commenced from the Pakistani side near the Uri Sector. However, Indian military officials quickly recognized this as a diversionary tactic. Pakistan aimed to draw Indian attention to the LoC, while the real action was expected to take place elsewhere.
And the Indian military assessment proved correct. By 9 a.m. the same day, five Pakistani fighter jets crossed the LoC, infiltrating 4 km into Indian territory near Nowshera and Pooch. They dropped bombs on four Indian military targets: Krishnaghati, Hamirpur, Gambhir, and the Narayana ammunition dump. However, they were unable to advance further, as Indian radars had already detected the intruders. The Indian Air Force (IAF) quickly scrambled fighter jets to intercept them.
Simultaneously, other Pakistani jets attempted to breach India’s airspace via the Rajasthan border, but these were also countered by the IAF.
Later that afternoon, around 3:15 p.m. IST, both India and Pakistan released official statements. 24 PAF aircraft had takeoff for India, but only five made it into Indian airspace. Despite the incursion, there was no damage to India, and the ammunition dumps remained secure.
Among the IAF jets engaged in intercepting the Pakistani aircraft was a MiG-21 Bison, piloted by Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman, who pursued a Pakistani F-16. During the encounter, a missile fired by another Pakistani F-16 struck the MiG-21, and it was shot down, crashing in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). Wing Commander Abhinandan ejected and parachuted into a village located just 7 km from the LoC.
Local residents gathered at the site, and soon, the Pakistan Army arrived. Unfortunately, the pilot was severely beaten, and he began bleeding.
This is How India’s Tough Diplomacy Brings Abhinandan Back
As soon as India learned that Wing Commander Abhinandan had been captured by Pakistan, all diplomatic channels were swiftly activated.
Indian Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale immediately met with the U.S. and U.K. Ambassadors to India, Kenneth I. Juster and Dominic Asquith, respectively. During the meeting at the South Block, Gokhale sent a strong message, urging them to communicate to Pakistan: “If a single scratch is inflicted on our pilot, we will escalate the situation with Pakistan, and there will be no hesitation in launching an attack. I am not speaking for myself; these are direct orders from the highest Indian authorities.” This same message was conveyed to the P5 members, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia, with the exception of China.
Gokhale also instructed the P5 Ambassadors to relay the message to their counterparts in the U.S., U.K., Russia, and France, who, in turn, were to pass it on to Pakistan’s military and civilian leadership.
The U.S., U.K., and French Ambassadors to Pakistan visited the Pakistan Foreign Ministry and ISI officials the same day, delivering a clear message: “India is serious this time.” This came as a surprise to Pakistan, which had not anticipated such aggressive diplomacy. Pakistan had been expecting a response from India similar to the one following the Parliament attack and the 2008 Mumbai attacks.
These diplomats also met with Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary, Tehmina Janjua, and then DG ISI, Asim Munir, to further underscore the message. They informed them, “The JeM has claimed responsibility for the Pulwama attack, and JeM Chief Masood Azhar is in Pakistan. We are certain of both these facts, and even if you deny them, we will not accept your denial.”
Ajay Bisaria noted that it was clear from these interactions that Western diplomats had full knowledge of Pakistan’s role in funding and supporting terrorism, particularly the Pulwama attack.
During the meeting, DG ISI Asim Munir attempted to deflect responsibility, claiming that Pakistan had no involvement and suggesting that the attack was politically motivated, blaming Indian Prime Minister Modi in the lead-up to India’s elections. However, before Munir could continue, the U.S. Ambassador sharply interrupted him, saying, “Don't go down this route. Don’t spew that typical nonsense.” The Ambassador reminded Munir that following the 9/11 attacks, Pakistan had also tried to shift blame onto the U.S. The U.S. Ambassador told Munir, “Just keep quiet,” causing the ISI chief to fall silent.
The following day, around 4 p.m., the U.S., U.K., and French Ambassadors to Pakistan were meeting at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad. They were preparing for a meeting with Pakistan's Foreign Secretary, Tehmina Janjua, scheduled for 5 p.m. The diplomats were finalizing their key talking points, with one priority: to demand the immediate release of the Indian pilot, Wing Commander Abhinandan. They made it clear that Pakistan had no other option but to comply.
The meeting with Tehmina Janjua began at 5 p.m. However, around 5:45 p.m., a person entered the room and handed a piece of paper to the Foreign Secretary. Upon reading it, Janjua’s expression changed dramatically. One of the ambassadors, who had been speaking, paused when he noticed the sudden shift. Janjua motioned for a break, took a glass of water, wiped her brow with a tissue, and then shared the contents of the paper with the diplomats. The document, sent by Pakistan’s intelligence, contained two alarming points:
Nine Indian missiles that Pakistan had not previously accounted for were now aimed at their territory and could be launched at any time.
The Indian Navy had adopted a highly aggressive posture.
At midnight the same day, Ajay Bisaria, the Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan, received a call from Suhail Mahmood, Pakistan’s High Commissioner to India. Mahmood informed him that the Pakistan Prime Minister’s Office had reached out, with Prime Minister Imran Khan urgently wanting to speak with Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Bisaria requested time to consult with Indian authorities. After discussing with senior officials, the Indian government decided to decline the call, stating that talks would only occur after the release of Abhinandan.
The following early morning, on February 28, the U.S. and U.K. envoys to India called Indian Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale to inform him that Pakistan was ready to de-escalate the situation and release Abhinandan. India learned of the imminent release a full 48 hours before it happened.
IAF’s Strategic Silence: Why No Proof of Airstrikes Was Shared Publicly?
Ajay Bisaria, in his book, addresses the issue of why the Indian Air Force decided not to release proof of the strikes in Balakot. He explains that it was a strategic decision to withhold the evidence and footage. The intelligence gathered by the military was highly sensitive and expensive, and revealing it could have easily allowed the enemy to identify the methods used to obtain the information. This could have exposed critical intelligence sources, whether human or technical.
To protect Indian intelligence assets and sources, both the IAF and the government decided against making their intelligence reports and data public.
At the End
This marked the success of India’s aggressive diplomacy, spearheaded by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and executed through the hard work of Indian diplomats. It was clear that India’s firm stance and unwavering pressure on Pakistan forced the hand of the Pakistani Army and government. Unfortunately, some naïve sections of the Indian public wrongly attributed the release to Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan’s so-called “humanitarian gesture”, which was nothing more than a false narrative.
A few days after these incidents, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Shah Mehmood Qureshi, made a rather surprising statement to a CNN journalist. He openly admitted, “JeM Chief Masood Azhar is in Pakistan. According to my information, he is very unwell. He is so unwell that he can’t leave his house.” Despite this acknowledgment, the Pakistan Army quickly denied his claims, insisting that Azhar was not in the country.
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